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Purpose – This paper seeks to explore the diverse expectations and manifestations of accountability 
for risk in the deep sea petroleum exploration arena of Aotearoa New Zealand.  
Methodology – The arena framework developed by Renn (1992) and applied to accountability 
research by Georgakopoulos and Thomson (2008) is implemented and developed, and informed by 
interviews with key actors in the arena. 
Findings –Actors perceive accountability for risk to come down to process. Accountability for risk 
is about providing an account for actions, past, present and future; a forum to debate this account; 
and a consideration of the Other in decision making. It was also found that diverse understandings 
of responsibility, including the Māori guardianship value of kaitiakitanga, can inform decision-
making and challenge existing interpretations of corporate and public responsibility. 
Originality/value – Aotearoa New Zealand is a country built around an official ‘partnership’ 
arrangement between the Government of New Zealand and Māori, and exploring this provides 
unique insights for accountability relationships. This is enhanced by examining a novel and 
controversial activity, deep sea petroleum exploration. The ability to participate in decision-making, 
the forum for the account, was more important for actors than the account itself. This research has 
also given ‘voice’ to actors not often considered in accounting research and policy-making and has 
thus uncovered a novel understanding of ‘accountability for risk’ in a conflict arena. 
Keywords: Accountability, Risk, Arena, Oil, New Zealand  
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It might never happen, or will it? The process of rendering 
(un)accountability in the deep-sea oil exploration arena. 
1. Introduction 
We live in a risk society, where risk is normalised into modern economic and social systems (Beck, 
1992). Extending this notion to global climate change, Unruh (2000) argues modern society has 
become ‘locked-in’ to a system dependent upon carbon. In the carbon locked-in risk society, 
everyday actions by individuals and organisations, such as driving to work, or flying to take a 
holiday, become construed as poisoning or polluting the atmosphere, yet since they do it just “a bit”, 
and remain culturally embedded, they remain acceptable (Beck, 1992, p. 64). Going further, Perrow 
(1999) refers to “normal accidents”, where the system which drives our society and economy has 
such a high level of interactive complexity and is so tightly coupled, that the climate crisis and 
catastrophic oil spills, for example, have become ‘normal’ – for some, incalculable and 
unpreventable but justifiable consequences of progress. Not only is there is a probability of given 
events occurring, then, consequences seem inevitable, and this in turn makes them ever more likely 
as they become an accepted part of the risk society. At collective and cumulative levels, ecological 
and social systems will certainly be negatively impacted by the consequences of economic events. 
Yet at local, individual, and organisational levels, such consequences might never happen. All of 
this begs the question of how do we hold others, as well as ourselves, accountable for the future 
consequences of actions and events that might never happen, but yet, paradoxically, certainly will? 
When a multi or transnational corporation operates in a controversial and environmentally sensitive 
industry, a legitimacy gap emerges between what it considers normal and acceptable, and what 
others so consider (Sethi, 1975; Lindblom, 1993; Patten, 1992). It is important to understand how 
accountability is discharged by organisations, both private and public, how this accountability is 
received and perceived by the actors concerned with that activity, and how opportunities emerge for 
actors to hold each other to account. Arguably the gap is amplified when actors engaging around an 
issue have vastly different interpretations of the future consequences of a given activity. Being 
accountable for what could happen in the future, as opposed to what did happen in the past, or 
accountability for risk, becomes a contest over something for which nobody has the answer. This 
provides significant challenges for a range of actors, but also a unique opportunity for research.  
This paper seeks to extend the framework developed by Renn (1992), and adopted in accountability 
research by Georgakopoulos and Thomson (2008), Dey and Russell (2014) and Thomson, Dey and 
Russell (2015). It seeks to explore actors’ diverse understandings and expectations of accountability 
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with a focus on the risk of the future consequences of events and actions yet to happen. The 
motivation for this research derives from the view that the concept of accountability can be 
fundamentally radical (Owen, 2008). When business leaders and politicians demonstrate a 
“profound reluctance to be held remotely accountable for any actions they take” (Owen, 2008, p. 
255), the study of accountability has significant emancipatory potential. Instead of focusing on 
managerial actors, this research focuses on a diverse range of actors engaging around an issue. 
Opening up this research to non-corporate actors has revealed where the less comfortable areas of 
conflict lie (Owen, 2008). In order to hold the powerful to account for their actions, voice must be 
given to the less powerful (O’Dwyer, Unerman & Bradley, 2005). 
At a time when prominent figures are talking about a climate crisis rather than climate change 
(Klein, 2014), deep sea petroleum exploration provides an ideal arena in which to examine 
accountability for risk. The one-two punch (Klein, 2014) of an economy built on fossil fuels is that 
when things go wrong, the results can be catastrophic - the interred carbon escapes at the source in 
the form of a spill or blowout. If it goes right, then carbon is successfully released into the 
atmosphere and the results, perpetuating the climate crisis, are also ultimately catastrophic (Klein, 
2014). Because of this, the stark reality of fossil fuel extraction is no longer just the problem of far-
off communities. It is difficult, however, to deny that to continue Western civilisation in its current 
form, fossil fuels are foreseen as essential for the future (Unruh, 2000), and human ingenuity has 
thus far prevented a catastrophic depletion of petroleum resources. One form of this ‘ingenuity’ is 
deep sea petroleum exploration. Another is shale oil and fracking, both of which remain highly 
contested interventions.  
Deep sea oil and petroleum exploration has become a contested technology in many areas around 
the globe (e.g., the Arctic, see Keil, 2015; Brazil, see Poulton, 2015; and the Gulf of Mexico, see 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011) and no 
less so in Aotearoa New Zealand. A central element in some of these contests, which provides an 
opportunity for understanding notions of accountability, concerns different beliefs, values and 
worldviews of actors, and especially in regard in some instances between First Nations peoples and 
modern Western thinking. Since 2010, the Government of New Zealand has pursued an aggressive 
petroleum exploration programme to “unlock New Zealand’s petroleum potential” (Key, 2010). 
Petroleum exploration is a novel activity for most areas of Aotearoa New Zealand and since the 
Deepwater Horizon1 and Rena2 disasters, the spectre of a catastrophic oil spill, along with scientific 
                                                            
1 The Deepwater Horizon oil-rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico killed 11 workers and caused immeasurable levels of 
economic, environmental, social and cultural damage. See Windsor & McNicholas, 2012. 
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consensus on the climate crisis have become significant points of contest. The ‘partnership’ bond 
between the Government of New Zealand and the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand, 
Māori, provides a unique basis for this study. However, since the exploration companies operating 
in the region are multinational, petroleum exploration is not just a local engagement; actors from 
across the country and globe become involved. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section two is a review and synthesis of prior literature focusing 
on use of the arena framework, accountability and the sociology of risk. Section three will set out 
the research methods. Section four will examine the conversations with actors around perceptions of 
accountability for risk and consultation processes. The fifth section will provide a discussion around 
findings. Finally, concluding thoughts and calls for further research will be considered. 
2. Accountability for risk 
2.1 The arena framework in SEA research 
Accounting and accountability for the social and environmental impacts of organisations have 
remained at the core of a significant sub-field of accounting research since the 1970s (e.g., Dierkes 
& Preston, 1977; Gray, Owen & Maunders, 1988; Tinker, 1991; Puxty, 1991; Gray, Dey, Owen, 
Evans & Zadek, 1997).  A dominant strand of the empirical social and environmental 
accounting/accountability (SEA) research has focused on the annual financial, social and 
environmental reports of firms (Mathews, 1997; Milne, 2007). Increasingly, though, researchers are 
turning their attention to other entities, and other media by which entities discharge their 
accountability, and engage with stakeholders. Georgakopoulos and Thomson (2008) investigate the 
relationship between engagement activities and social reporting practices in the salmon farming 
industry of Scotland. They include communications among different stakeholders and further 
develop the arena framework presented in Renn (1992). They find social reporting is fragmented, 
driven by many factors and does not necessarily lead to a resolution of conflicts in the arena. They 
suggest research consider co-existence and co-evolution of different ‘social reports’.  
Dey and Russell (2014) apply the arena framework to explore the use of accounts in answering the 
question who speaks for the river? Examining the conflict between actors around the development 
of a hydroelectric dam on the River Garry in Scotland, they argue that the arena framework allowed 
them to identify significant accounting practices above and beyond those found in examining 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
2 The Rena was an offshore owned container ship which struck the Astrolabe Reef off the coast of Tauranga, New 
Zealand in 2011. Over 350 tonnes of oil leaked from the ship, as well as debris from containers. The wreck remains on 
the reef to this day, and it has been described as New Zealand’s “worst environmental disaster” (Robson, 2012). 
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annual reports. The authors illustrate how a campaign to reform, rather than halt, the project used 
problematising external accounts as a strategy for media amplification, many of which were 
biodiversity accounts.  
And more recently, Thomson, Dey and Russell (2015) apply and extend the arena framework to 
explore how activists in a conflict arena use external accounts to create change. The authors conduct 
a single longitudinal case study on the use of external accounts and other resistance practices by 
Action on Smoking and Health UK (ASH), who seek to de-legitimate all aspects of tobacco 
production, consumption and governance. The authors confirm that examining the accounting 
practices of social movements rather than corporations provides significant potential to enhance 
knowledge around accounting’s ability to bring about social and environmental change. They find 
that the use of external accounts was a key tool used by ASH to “de-normalise and de-legitimate” (p. 
811) tobacco related activities. This provided empirical evidence of the practice of “accounting “for 
the other, by the other” (Dey, Russell & Thomson, 2010, as cited in Thomson et al. 2015, p. 811).  
2.2 Accountability  
Sinclair (1995) points out that accountability appears to reside in a “bottomless swamp” (p. 221).  
The more definitive we attempt to render the concept, the more murky it becomes (Dahl, 1957 as 
cited in Sinclair, 1995). There is a large body of literature spanning several decades attempting to 
define and theorise the elusive term ‘accountability’. Early sociological work seeks to construct and 
describe what an account is and why this might be provided. Mills (1940) explores the concept of 
‘motives’, which can be considered as “typical vocabularies having ascertainable functions in 
delimited societal situations” (p. 904). The importance of an exploration into motives is to 
understand the reasons why actors provide different justifications for their actions. Scott and Lyman 
(1968) argue that “an account is a linguistic device employed whenever an action is subjected to 
evaluative inquiry” (p. 46). These devices are crucial to bridge “the gap between actions and 
expectations” (p. 46).  
Dubnick and Justice (2004) suggest that a key to researching, operationalising and measuring 
accountability is to distinguish between accountability-the-word and accountability-the-concept. 
The authors argue that claims of accountability made by political and administrative reformers seem 
to regard the term as a universal cure for any challenge in governance. Promises made by these 
orators are rarely questioned and the development of an empirically grounded concept of 
accountability would enable these promises to be treated as testable hypotheses rather than “self-
evident truths” (p. 4). The authors advise that accountability-the-concept can be “regarded as a kind 
of performative moral discourse, a form of governance that depends on the dynamic social 
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interactions and mechanisms created within such a moral community” (p. 12). The authors propose 
a framework for the empirical study of accountability which begins with three traits: the social 
relations that form the context for action; normative points of reference to compare with accounted 
for actions; and the processes or mechanisms by which the relationships result in particular actions 
by actors in those relationships. They suggest a useful path forward will be to try to understand how 
beliefs about what one is expected to account for are created and how responses to these beliefs lead 
to collective outcomes.  
Gray, Owen and Maunders (1991) define accountability as “the onus, requirement or responsibility 
to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of the actions for 
which one is held responsible” (p. 4). The authors also argue that the channel of accountability can 
be more important than the account itself (Gray, 1978, as cited in Gray, Owen and Maunders, 1991). 
Stewart (1984) develops a framework for the role of information in public accountability, the 
‘ladder of accountability.’ The author argues that the increasing scale and complexity of 
government has resulted in the degradation of traditional bonds of public accountability, in both the 
providing of an account and the ability to hold to account. Stewart holds that information is power, 
but this information is a basis for judgment and action in the holding to account. Merely providing 
the information is insufficient, and without opportunities to hold to account, then public 
accountability cannot exist (see also Cooper and Owen, 2007).  
Ranson (2003) provides a detailed literature review on different interpretations of public 
accountability from an education perspective. These include technical and generally more widely 
accepted definitions of accountability such as “to be accountable, conventionally, is to be ‘held to 
account,’ defining a relationship of formal control between parties, one of whom is mandatorily 
held to account to the other for the exercise of roles and stewardship of public resources” (Ranson, 
2003, p. 460). As well as more sociologically derived definitions such as “to be accountable for 
one’s activities is both to explicate the reasons for them, and to supply the normative grounds 
whereby they may be justified” (Giddens 1984, as cited in Ranson, 2003, p. 461). 
Boland and Schultze (1996) provide an enlightening foundation for which we may build our 
understanding of accountability and how it can be socially constructed.  The authors suggest that 
“accountability is the capacity and willingness to give explanations for conduct, stating how one has 
discharged one’s responsibilities” (p. 62). This is similar to previous definitions but the authors 
expand on where this was founded. Accountability involves both an explaining of conduct with a 
credible story and a calculation and balancing of competing obligations, including moral ones. Here, 
the key introductions are the ideas that ‘to account’ is to tell a story, and that moral obligations are 
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included and must be balanced. Boland and Schultze (1996) elaborate that these two facets of 
accountability can be seen in the etymology of the word ‘account’. “In the Oxford English 
Dictionary, we see that account comes from both the Old French a conter, meaning to tell a story 
and from the late Latin accomputare, meaning to compute” (Boland & Schultze, 1996, p. 62-63, 
emphasis in original). Remembering the roots of words, which the complexity of our society has 
rendered ambiguous, is crucial to understanding how these words can be socially constructed. 
Accountability thus entails the giving of an account as a narration of what occurred (a story-line) 
and the giving of an account as in a reckoning of money (Boland & Schultze, 1996, p. 63).  
Sinclair (1995) notes that accountability is subjectively constructed and that it changes with context. 
The author performs a discourse analysis to examine changing forms of accountability among 
CEOs in the public sector, and argues that there is great value in interpretive perspectives to 
redevelop thought around phenomena like accountability. How society defines accountability is 
crucially “dependent on the ideologies, motifs and language of our times” (Sinclair, 1995, p. 221). 
Boland and Schultze (1996) support this stance with their assertion that organisations and 
accountability are social constructions and the narrative mode of cognition is the engine of that 
construction process. The authors go on to discuss the relevance of accountability as story-telling. 
At face value, a story can often be understood as a meaningful reconstruction of the world. Because 
of this, it is not provable by our common standards of analytic and cumulative logic. The narrative 
mode of accountability can therefore not “step outside of itself to corroborate its truth claims” 
(Lyotard, as cited in Boland & Schultze, 1996, p. 69). Instead, the narrator will appeal to things like 
common sense and other belief systems which will be shared between the narrator and the listener, 
meaning plausibility and believability are the basis for truth. This shows us that stories, and 
therefore accountability, are “anchored in a culture” (p. 69).  
Shearer (2002) argues that economic theory “discursively creates the very conditions that render it 
applicable – thus enabling an imperialism that effectively opens the whole of human experience to 
economic description and prescription” (p. 549). Therefore, the social and cultural expectations of 
accountability will be a conception of “moral identity such that the reciprocal pursuit of private 
interest becomes the sole ethical imperative of subjects in commerce with one another” (p. 558). 
However, Shearer makes an argument for the need to establish accountability as “a moral 
phenomenon that both can and should be subject to ethical reflection” (p. 545). There is a general 
consensus within the accountability and related literature that we need an accountability to wider 
human and environmental purposes. Shearer (2002) concludes that:  
We must make our systems of account more responsive to the Other, both the other who stands 
outside of the market transactions of the economic agent and the subjectivity of the other as 
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Other who, entering into economic transactions, is transmuted into a commodity whose only 
worth inheres in appropriation (Shearer, 2002, p. 568).  
Much accountability practice and research has focused on retrospective accountability. Because this 
paper seeks to focus on accountability for what could happen, the following examination of the 
sociology of risk literature will help to develop a framework to inform accountability for risk. 
2.3 Risk 
Talking about risks faces the immediate danger that everybody talks about something different 
(Klinke & Renn, 2001, p. 159).  
Aven and Renn (2009) propose that a suitable definition of risk is “risk refers to uncertainty about 
and severity of the events and consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something 
that humans value” (p. 6). This incorporates uncertainty, which is an epistemological component of 
risk, as well as severity of events and consequences, which is the ontological component of risk. In 
this way, risks are not a state of the world but rather the events associated with the risk are. Risk is 
therefore subject to human values, judgment and constructions. It is unlikely that every individual 
or group active in an engagement will have the same interpretation of what the risk(s) of that 
engagement is/are. In this way, risk, just as with accountability, is a construct dependent on 
personal experience, ideology, exposure to media, social and political influences and personal 
networks (Dake, 1992). Since risk refers to the potential of a real outcome, it is both a social 
construction and a representation of reality (Dake, 1992). 
Dake (1992) argues that cultural theory accounts for the social construction of risk in terms of three 
linked domains that constitute a way of life: cultural biases, social relations, and behavioural 
strategies. Dake defines cultural biases as shared beliefs and values that justify different ways of 
behaving. They are worldviews corresponding to different patterns of social relations. The author 
finds in empirical testing that those who hold an egalitarian bias found dangers associated with most 
technologies as great, and benefits as small. Those who have individualist and hierarchical leanings 
have quite different ranking preferences for dangers. The implications of this study are that 
worldviews equate to powerful lenses which act to magnify one danger, obscure another, and may 
even disregard others. Dake (1992) uses these findings to reject the 18th century notion that risks are 
evident to anyone with common sense for the idea that perceptions of risk depend in part on 




2.4 Risk communication 
The position of Renn and Sellke (2011) is that effective communication must be at the centre of any 
attempt to assess and manage risk. Risk communication must be present throughout the entire 
process from framing to monitoring impacts. According to Aven and Renn (2012) risk 
communication is the key element involved in developing an understanding of risk governance. The 
primary task of risk communication is creating a bridge between expert judgment and public 
perceptions of risk. The authors identify four major functions of risk communication to aid in 
informed decision-making. These are education and enlightenment; risk training and inducement of 
behavioural changes; promotion of confidence in institutions responsible for the assessment and 
management of risks; and involvement in risk-related decisions and conflict resolution (Aven & 
Renn, 2012, p. 1563). 
Kasperson and Kasperson (2005) co-edited a detailed book on the subject of risk communication 
that includes a variety of strategies, common pit-falls and calls for further research. The authors 
suggest that the first generation of risk communication was synonymous with what we refer to as 
public relations today.  It was about identifying the target audience, developing the right messages 
and communicating through the right channels. Next came the ‘stakeholder express’, which 
included limited public participation and stakeholder involvement, but this was often after 
predetermined outcomes had been decided on, so was relatively token. The primary constraint 
during these times was the failure of risk managers to listen and act upon feedback from the 
stakeholders or actors who were bearing the risk.  
Kasperson (2005) presents six propositions on public participation and their relevance for risk 
communication and explores each of these in detail. The propositions are differences in means/ends 
expectations, the timing of the programme, the role of credibility and trust, the need for technical 
and analytical resources, differing thresholds of public involvement, and limitations upon current 
understandings. Proposition two, the timing of the programme, provides some useful insights for 
this research. The author refers to the most common form of inadequate programme timing as 
“decide, announce and defend” (Ducsik & Austin, as cited in Kasperson, 2005, p. 22). This is the 
idea that public participation is merely tokenism, and the risk manager or authority has a 
predetermined outcome in mind. The author also provides ample evidence of the alienating and 
often ineffective result of communication and engagement through public hearings, and stresses the 
need for the ability to act upon knowledge. The author argues that the risk communicator needs to 
develop a strong listening capacity to discern issues about distribution of risk and return. Often, risk 
debates extend far beyond institutional issues and tap into fundamental concerns about the 
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underlying values and overall worldviews of actors (p. 45). Renn and Sellke (2011) argue that it is 
“not the task of communicators to decide what people need to know but to respond to the questions 
of what people want to know” (p. 362). It is clear within risk communication, that a number of 
positions will arise in a risk arena, and risk communicators must take steps to ensure that all these 
positions are considered within decision-making.  
Two parallel themes have emerged throughout the accountability and sociology of risk literature. 
Firstly, that both accountability and risk are better understood as concepts rather than definitive 
words. In this way, both of the concepts are perceived differently by various actors, but these are 
diverse constructions of concrete outcomes. Secondly, once deconstructed to concrete outcomes, 
both accountability and risk communication require at least two features, the provision of 
information or an account, and the opportunity to act on that information or hold to account. We 
will therefore follow the leads of Stewart (1984) and Kasperson (2005) in examining perceptions 
and expectations of accountability for risk in the deep sea petroleum exploration arena of Aotearoa 
New Zealand.  
3. Research Methods 
3.1 The arena framework 
This paper applies the arena framework conceived by Renn (1992) and then adapted to studies of 
social and environmental accountability by Georgakopoulos and Thomson (2008), Dey and Russell 
(2014) and Thomson, Dey and Russell (2015). This work seeks to build on previous applications by 
exploring perceptions and manifestations of public, corporate, and personal accountability by actors 
engaging around deep sea petroleum exploration in Aotearoa New Zealand. Georgakopoulos and 
Thomson (2008) advise that there is more needed to understand the social and environmental 
impacts of a company or sector than a single social report from a single participant. Understanding 
is composed of the information that flows from different engagements, and depends on what 
information is made available to other parties (Georgakopoulos & Thomson, 2008). Given the wide 
nature of the deep sea petroleum exploration engagement in Aotearoa New Zealand, which includes 
strong political and commercial support, strong political opposition, extensive media coverage, 
ardent activism, and indigenous engagement, we believe the breadth of information in the discourse 
necessitates an application of the arena framework. Figure 1 below illustrates the arena framework 


















The arena framework allows the differentiation of stakeholders and the consideration of interactions 
and engagement dynamics around an issue (Renn, 1992) by altering the entity concept away from a 
single organisation towards an issue around which different organisations engage (Georgakopoulos 
& Thomson, 2008). The arena expands out from the false dichotomy of simple “antagonist-
protagonist” (Thomson, Dey & Russell, 2015, p. 812) relations often illustrated in the media and 
opens up the potential for a complex web of interrelationships, engagement dynamics and therefore 
expectations of accountability relationships between a range of diverse and often polarised actors. 
Further, in the framework, Renn (1992) proposes that power dynamics affect the nature of 
engagements and social reporting practices. Powerful participants can access all the information 
they require but less powerful participants may only have restricted access. Because of this, 
engagement activities may address power imbalances, for example, the sharing of data and 
resources for a common purpose (Georgakopoulos & Thomson, 2008, p. 1123). When a single 
Figure 1: The Aotearoa New Zealand petroleum exploration arena 
 
Adapted from: Renn, 1992, p. 192, as used in Geograkopoulos & Thomson, p. 1120. 
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multinational corporation, Anadarko, has assets equal to almost a third of Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
GDP (Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, 2015; Statistics New Zealand, 2015), as well as over 3,000 
times the assets, and 400 times the revenue of a regulator (Environmental Protection Authority, 
2015), then there will be imbalances that need addressing. Thus, it is necessary to apply a 
framework to the engagement, which includes the consideration of power imbalances.   
The arena describes the symbolic location of actions, social or political, which influence collective 
decisions or policies (Renn, 1992, p. 181). The arena provides actors with the ability to engage with 
decision makers and influence outcomes. Behaviour is not defined by traditional roles and routines, 
actors may use innovative approaches as well as traditional methods. However, arenas are regulated 
by norms and rules. Actors can abide by these rules or ignore them if they feel they will not gain 
public support, or if the rule enforcer is not powerful enough to regulate actors who violate the rules. 
The arena and its rules are not static, interactions may change the rules as they occur, and social and 
political actions may evolve as “actors experience the boundaries of tolerance for limited rule 
violations” (p. 184). Renn (1992) argues that the arena gives researchers a clearer understanding of 
“the structural factors that shape interactions among actors and influence the outcome of social 
conflicts over risk” (p. 180). 
Renn (1992) refers to the evidence trap. This is the idea that finding a compromise during a conflict 
requires agreement on evidence. Each actor or group in the arena can provide conflicting evidence 
about impacts, probabilities and likelihoods. Which evidence is right or represents the truth?  This 
conflicting evidence makes it difficult to reach a consensus. Most members of the public are often 
confused and frustrated by the competing evidence claims and the resulting ambiguity presented by 
different actors. The public has developed several strategies to deal with this confusion and 
frustration, which can often lead to credible information being rejected if it challenges belief 
systems. Social actors tend to use moralisation and polarisation to mobilise support because it 
provides them with value commitment and social influence (Renn, 1992, p. 192). As the conflict 
approaches resolution, often evidence is contested so it is not able to play a substantial role in 
compromise. Value commitment and social prestige are polarised between adversarial actors and 
their supporters.  
Thomson, Dey and Russell (2015) extend the arena framework by evaluating engagement activities, 
theorising around actor intentions and states of conflict, as well as the consideration of multiple, 
interacting conflict arenas. According to the authors, this development allows a more considered 
exploration of long-term activist campaigns, involving reflexive engagement among actors and 
across arenas. This is an important development in the context of this study which is a new, but 
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ongoing conflict with no end in sight. In this “dynamic conflict arena framework” (p. 809), 
Thomson, Dey and Russell argue that action by activists needs to be evaluated in three ways: new 
visibilities created; the entity they are seeking to transform and; the level of transformation sought.  
The social arena framework provides a sophisticated and powerful instrument to analyse the 
discourse surrounding issues and risks in particular. It helps to clarify the actuality that often risk 
conflicts may not actually be about risks but the symbolic issues and actions involved in the risk 
debate. Previous work has focused on perceptions, actions and social phenomena of engagements 
without acknowledging the social, political or cultural context. The framework provides a tool to 
examine the structural rules and norms within the arena as well as the perceptions of the actors. This 
research then seeks to extend prior understanding of the arena framework by empirically exploring 
the perceptions, expectations and manifestations of the concept of accountability within a relatively 
new, but increasingly contested conflict arena.  
3.2 Interviews 
Data collection was undertaken through semi-structured conversations (Walton, 2007) with key 
actors engaging around the arena. This was supplemented by reviews of documentation and media 
to provide context. The conversations heard the stories of the conflict (Walton, 2007), and provided 
accounts of insiders’ interpretations of the context (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, as cited in Walton, 
2007). 17 unique interviews were conducted, 16 individual conversations and one group 
conversation. The conversations were conducted between 30 December 2014 and 27 March 2015 
around Aotearoa New Zealand and lasted between 30 and 90 minutes each. Interviews were 
recorded with the permission of participants. The majority of these actors were willing to be 
acknowledged by name and have their comments attributed to them, but to protect the identities of 
those participants unwilling to be acknowledged pseudonyms were given to all participants. We 
worked together to come up with suitable role descriptions. Participants were given the option to 
review and confirm quotes and ideas attributed to them. Email was the main form of contact. Every 
participant but four responded, and interviews were arranged if both the researcher and the 
participant felt it was necessary at the time. A rule enforcer suggested other more appropriate 
contacts, two industry participants, one industry supporter and one iwi3 representative did not reply 
at all. Participants included government agency representatives (2), opposition members of 
parliament (MPs) (3), iwi members (3), climate and oil free activists (4), affected business owners 
(2), city councillors (2), a journalist and an industry representative.  
                                                            
3 Iwi is a broad term taken to mean an extended kinship group, tribe, nation, people, nationality. 
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4. Perceptions of accountability 
Transnational corporations are only allowed to operate in regions where their operations have been 
sanctioned by the governing body - in this case the Government of New Zealand. In Aotearoa New 
Zealand there is generally a trust placed in the public sector to protect public interests, but there is 
also an expectation of corporate and individual responsibility within society. Thus, three levels of 
accountability emerged from data collection; corporate, public, and moral/personal. 
4.1 Corporate accountability 
Two participants discussed what they expect from industry. One of these was ‘internalising 
externalities’ or the polluter pays principle. Sam, a climate campaigner argued that she would like 
to see companies “actually paying for the damage that they create, I mean they’re not even 
potentially going to pay for potential damage. So that makes it so much more economically viable 
for them4.” Pam, a tourism operator, challenged the shareholder primacy principle which, despite 
theories of corporate social responsibility and legitimacy, is the fundamental driver of corporate 
behaviour. “It’s got to be about looking to the future, looking at what they’re doing and how that’s 
going to affect their children, and their children’s children. Not just how much money they as a 
company are going to make.” This is an example of trying to moralise the industry. 
When it comes down to it, the petroleum industry will explore for, and produce petroleum. It is up 
to a government to decide whether or not that is an acceptable activity for a region, country or 
globe, and it is up to the people to elect that government. Therefore, we did not find a lot of 
expectation of industry from participants – most saw the onus on the Government. Faye, former 
opposition MP, and current climate campaigner reflected: 
It’s quite a large stretch to expect a United States owned oil drilling company to be accountable 
to the likes of me. I mean from a moral point of view, yes, anywhere that you want to drill you 
should be connecting with the people who live in that area. But they’re from a different nation, 
they expect to have to engage with the laws of the country where they’re going and they expect 
that to be enough. So the people who really need to be accountable to us are the Government, 
who pass those laws (Faye). 
There was indirect agreement with this sentiment from Graham, an industry representative. To him, 
accountability was “about being clear, transparent and upfront about what you are doing and then 
similarly being clear, transparent and up front about whether you achieved that or not.” This takes 
                                                            
4 We have actually seen an incremental move towards this recently with government officials, under pressure from the 
Green Party, working to lift the minimum insurance equivalent carried by oil rigs from $27 million, which would not 
even cover the costs of the Rena disaster (Frykberg, 2015). 
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the view that the industry will do what they are there to do, but they will be open and honest about 
it.  
4.2 Public accountability 
When asked about the Government’s role in deep sea exploration, Yani, a climate solutions 
campaigner responded that “these are public resources, they’re in public ownership and the 
Government is the custodian of those on behalf of the population.” Fran, another activist, shared the 
sentiment that this is a public decision. “Our Government aren’t really taking into account that this 
is a decision that needs to be made by the people of New Zealand as opposed to by the people that 
are sitting in parliament.” Sam, a climate campaigner, merely wanted to “feel like I was being 
listened to, and any concerns at all were even being listened to.” This demonstrates a desire to be 
able to partake in an official dialogue around the activity, despite the outcome. It is an indication of 
the tension between representative democracy, where an elected government has a mandate to do 
anything, and participatory democracy where the public is included in decision-making. Both of 
these tensions must be considered when exploring interpretations of accountability. 
Faye, in her experience as a former legislator, took a holistic view. She claimed that at the public 
level there are two forms of accountability “you need consultation with people, and you also need 
the protection of the technical standards.” The technical standards being the legislation and 
regulation around a particular industry. The other current or former MPs we talked to all shared this 
sentiment – that accountability occurred during the legislative process. Wendy argues that 
“accountability, to me, needs to be proactive. Accountability isn’t something we need to measure or 
think about after something bad happens. Accountability for me is having the right regulatory 
framework in place before we allow things to happen.”  
4.3 Moral/personal accountability 
A small number of participants painted a picture of accountability laced with morality. Fran, an oil-
free activist argues that every single New Zealander is responsible for what occurs in their country. 
“If a spill were to happen we’d all have to be held partially accountable because we let the decision 
be taken out of our hands in full knowledge that it was a reckless and dangerous idea.” This view 
takes a personal responsibility to what is happening around oneself, and it is about accountability to 
the Other. The most important Other, in terms of oppositional response in this arena, is future 
generations. Henry, an opposition MP, argues that “at its heart, accountability is being able to look 
your kids in the eye and know that their future is protected. You’re on a path to a safe future for 
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your kids, but also a stable, prosperous future.” This responsibility to future generations is the most 
common use of language to frame responses by climate and fossil fuel activists.  
Andy, a climate campaigner took a moral view of accountability. He argues that the point at which 
you have a breakthrough in communicating with others is “when you force them to consider the 
moral veracity of their decision.” Here he is talking about the public as well as governmental and 
industry actors. Andy suggests that people will behave according to social norms, but the “norm is 
not necessarily the right thing, or the moral thing, even in your own view. You don’t necessarily 
always do what you think is the morally correct thing to do, you do it because it’s generalised 
behaviour.” Here he is talking about how people act, and why they act that way. But what is moral 
accountability? 
Accountability is the deep and thoughtful reflection on whether the actions we are taking or not 
taking are really good enough, are really sufficient for us in ourselves, to the best of our ability. 
Evaluating what we want for our present, what we want for our future, and what we’re 
responsible for, in terms of our community, our society, our family, our world, and our 
environment (Andy). 
This is very much an individual responsibility for how one’s behaviour relates to the Other. He says 
that moral action should always be about the Other, rather than the self. It is “about how your 
actions are going to have an impact on others. That’s when you take a moral decision process and 
you should choose to take that because you should just choose to take that.” This is at the individual 
level but Andy takes moral accountability to a societal level. He emphasises the importance of 
critical self-reflection in society, but especially by individuals in positions of formal power 
“irrespective of whether it’s the position of their party, irrespective even of public opinion. Public 
opinion can’t be a measure of moral right.” Societal decision-making comes back to the Other also. 
“It is important that we are actually considering the Other, and the Other being the immediate 
Other, and the long term Other - the future generations, the people that rely on us.” 
4.4 Katiakitanga5  
Serena, who identifies as Māori and works with a number of rūnanga6 and environmental groups 
considered accountability to be “always wanting good outcomes for people and the environment, so 
when I think of being accountable, that’s what I’m thinking of.” “I can’t see it as not relating, when 
I say good environment for people and community, that then takes in their welfare, their health, and 
their education.” In traditional neoclassical terms, accountability is generally associated with 
                                                            
5 Kaitiakitanga is a Māori cultural value which translates roughly to imply guardianship, protection, care and vigilance 
(Kamira, 2003). It introduces the idea of an intergenerational responsibility and obligation to protect, rather than 
implying ownership (Kamira, 2003). 
6 A rūnanga/rūnaka is a traditional assembly, gathering or tribal council. 
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providing an account for financial resources, but according to Serena, it is about much more than 
that. “We do talk economics now, because we realise we need money, but it’s about people’s 
wellbeing and I don’t believe people can be well and healthy, if the environment isn’t. The two run 
together.”  
When we asked Serena whether she felt like she was able to act as a kaitiaki (guardian) in the deep 
sea petroleum exploration arena, despite some disillusionment with her power to enact change, she 
responded that yes she had. “I would hate it if we hadn’t, but we’ve been active. We’ve been very 
active and that’s the main thing.” “I don’t think we’ve been successful in achieving what we want to 
achieve, but listening to people, sharing information, and creating the ability to have the 
conversation and kōrero7 I think is really important.” 
Not a single participant reduced accountability down to providing a traditional financial account, so 
it is clear, from all actors in the arena that accountability is about more than this.  The tension is 
between issues of inter versus intra generational equity – accountability to current or future 
generations, as well as anthropocentric versus non-anthropocentric accountability. Despite this, 
there was a general theme of accountability to the Other. The conflict is over who or what is the 
Other. In general though, the most common themes emerging around accountability came down to 
process. It was about involving the public in decision-making, at all stages of the process. During 
the interview process it emerged that a key mechanism of the sort of accountability sought by the 
majority of actors, from around the arena, involved engagement, consultation, and strong dialogue.  
4.5 Manifestations of accountability: Consultation 
Under the most recent piece of petroleum-related legislation, the Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012, petroleum exploration is classified as a non-
notified activity. This means that an application for a marine consent for petroleum exploration is 
not publicly notified, so long as certain regulations are met (Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects – Non-notified Activities) Regulations, 2014). However, 
under Te Tiriti/The Treaty o/of Waitangi8 settlement process, national and local bodies are required 
to give consideration to, consult with, or include Māori in the formulation, implementation, or 
delivery of public policy (Ruckstuhl, Thompson-Fawcett & Rae, 2014). In addition, central and 
local government must give consideration to the principles of Te Tiriti/Treaty, and one such 
principle is ‘partnership’. The partnership approach emphasises the continuing and on-going nature 
of resource usage that requires continual dialogue (Ruckstuhl, Thompson-Fawcett & Rae, 2014). 
                                                            
7 Speech, narrative, story, news, account, discussion, conversation, discourse, statement, information  
8 See Jacobs (2000) for a discussion and history of Te Tiriti/The Treaty of Waitangi from an accountability perspective. 
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This means that the key engagement between Government, industry and the public was during iwi-
consultations on maraes9. A number of interviews touched on this consultation process. In this 
particular piece of research the consultation processes discussed were referred to as a fait acompli, 
monster out of the bag, lip service, box ticking, a public relations exercise and an outsourcing of the 
Government’s responsibilities. However, several actors felt that the process was relatively 
empowering, despite not getting exact outcomes, and it depended on where and when the 
consultation happened during the process. 
Pam and John, tourism operators in Kaikōura who did not consider themselves activists “by any 
stretch of the imagination” attended a consultation with Anadarko and representatives from the 
Government on the Takahanga Marae10 to ascertain the benefits for the region from oil exploration. 
When asked for their views on the benefits to Kaikōura or the country, Pam responded that they 
“were hoping that would be one of the things we could come away with, being able to weigh it up, 
but we didn’t come out in any way, shape or form convinced.” During the meeting John just wanted 
to ask “well hey, it’s too late, we’ve let the cat out of the bag, why are we having these meetings 
now when the Government has already decided that these guys can go ahead and do that?” The 
impression that Pam got was that “they’re doing it because they have to, not because they genuinely 
care about any given community.” Consultation is not actually consultation if the consulting party 
has a predetermined outcome (Kasperson, 2005). 
Graham, a prominent industry representative with a background in community engagement, 
provided the industry’s point of view on consultation.  
The consenting regimes are generally seeking to have people talk to communities, and even if 
they weren’t… Well best practice would indicate that they would. If you lose the trust and 
confidence of the communities in which you operate, you’ll be pretty short lived. Our industry 
really values that (Graham). 
From Graham’s perspective, consulting with the community appears to be just as important for 
industry as it is for community. This would seem to confirm Kuruppu and Milne’s (2014) argument 
that legitimacy is a ‘license to operate’ which provides some measure of society’s ‘acceptance’ of a 
company’s operations. According to the authors, this is especially rendered through company-local 
community relations. However, is it the industry’s job to consult with the public on what they are 
going to do when the Government that represents that public has been put in place to protect their 
interests? Several of the actors we spoke with thought it was a buck passing activity. 
                                                            
9 An open area where formal greetings and discussions take place. 
10 The place where Ngāti Kuri gather to kōrero and dialogue (Kaikōura) 
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I don’t think that it is the company’s job to consult with the community. I think that there’s a 
step that has been missed, which is a conversation between the Government and its people about 
whether or not an activity is appropriate or right in a community (Mary, a city councillor). 
Rachael, a Māori academic engaging with the mining industry, agreed with this sentiment when it 
came to iwi consultation. Referring to the Government’s partnership obligations with iwi, Rachael 
argues that “what I think they’re doing is outsourcing their responsibilities.” An important question 
to ask is what do these engagements mean for the affected rūnanga? According to Rachael, it is not 
just about having a meeting, it is about “meeting them [industry and government] to understand 
why we would want to engage and what elements that we want them to really understand about us. 
This is not about giving position, this is about deciding where the line is for us.” Serena reflects on 
this. “We have huis11 to come together and to understand… you don’t know because you’re still 
learning what it’s about.” Iwi and communities not knowing what a consultation or activity is really 
about can be incredibly detrimental to the effectiveness of the consultation process. Serena suggests 
that the huis would be more effective “if we had had time to work with the community, to be 
facilitated as a community, to talk about the issues.” The lack of preparation meant that “whether 
you’re coming armed with correct information is another story.” “We brought everyone to the party 
to try and understand, to try and have a conversation with the Government and with Anadarko… 
but we needed huis before then.” This indicates the importance for iwi, but also for any actor 
looking to engage seriously with the government or industry, of time and information to be able to 
prepare an argument before a consultation. Kasperson (2005) stresses the importance of timing in a 
communication programme as well as the importance of the ability to act upon knowledge rather 
than just be provided with it, which is echoed in public accountability literature by Stewart (1984). 
Graham, the industry representative, was able to provide an explanation of the necessity of iwi 
engagement and consultation from the industry’s perspective. Using an example of training iwi 
representatives in marine mammal observation, he argued that “rather than pay lip service to 
people,” the industry can “actually try to tangibly make a difference, actually do something that is 
meaningful for them.” He referred to this as a “tangible expression of kaitiakitanga,” which can be 
taken to mean an industry perspective of enabling Māori to actively participate in the guardianship 
of rohe (territories). 
We asked Rachael for her opinion – as an academic who represents her rūnaka – on whether 
partnership and kaitiakitanga were present, or enabled during this consultation process. She 
answered that it is a lot more complicated than this simple question, but that this particular process 
was not partnership. The iwi’s partners are the Crown. “Our partners are not oil and gas companies 
                                                            
11 Gathering, meeting, assembly, seminar, conference 
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so we just need to be clear that there’s a distinction there. The Crown puts it onto its agencies to say 
‘how can we show that we are a partnership?’” We had to clarify, for this research, what the ‘Crown’ 
actually means. Serena “expects relationships with all, from bottom to top” of government, 
including agencies, representatives and ministers “because we see the person on the bottom as just 
as important as the minister. There’s a hierarchy and that’s fine, but yeah… Every level, as all the 
people are doing really important things.”  
Serena expects to be treated as a partner of the Crown, but “different agencies do that differently, 
and there’s only a few who seem to realise that they’re our partner.” She cites the Department of 
Conservation and Environment Canterbury (a regional council) as good examples, but when we 
asked her whether she feels like she has been a partner in this process, she replied “No, it’s like 
‘we’ve got to do this’, it seems, ‘so we’re just going to go through the motions and pat you on the 
head like a small child.’” We asked her what could be done better to enhance this partnership. 
“Well if it could be demonstrated that they’re actually listening to some of the issues… Whether I 
accept it or not is neither here nor there… I don’t feel heard.” Serena continues that “there have 
been individuals in this process who I’ve talked to, from Anadarko, and from the Government, who 
have been very, very nice people. Who I’ve felt have listened to me, but they don’t have enough 
power” to make any tangible difference. Sarah, an opposition MP, suggested that a reason for this 
may be that under the current Government, the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment 
“has got even bigger, so it’s much more difficult to influence. It’s a bit like the titanic, a super-liner, 
changing its direction is quite difficult.” This issue was noted by Stewart (1984). This has been a 
recurring theme throughout iwi engagements with the ‘Crown’ and it has informally been referred 
to in the past as a many headed hydra. 
This outsourcing of the Crown’s partnership responsibilities created an issue which was observed 
and considered by iwi and the industry. If the Crown has not consulted with iwi as a partner at the 
outset then every single company must do this, every single time, with every single iwi. “Our 
rūnaka, like a lot of hapū12 and iwi up and down the country, has been bombarded with requests for 
engagements with oil and gas companies for about the last five years” (Rachael). Graham, the 
industry representative provides an explanation as to why the engagement process may be more of a 
burden to some iwi than an opportunity. “For iwi, engagement with a petroleum company is one of 
20, 30, 50, 100 things on their agenda.” He even followed up some weeks later about having mulled 
over this exact point. “I am mindful of the responsibilities that these groups feel to engage and 





problem at the iwi and hapū level, but it is also required in the “legislation framework (e.g. the 
RMA13) which stipulates engagement to occur with iwi, for example, but without the provision for 
resources to enable iwi to do this.” Serena supports this sentiment. “We are very short on people 
resources, with people who are involved with the environmental area. That’s the area that I have put 
all my energies into, and that’s probably the area that our rūnanga is most active in.” The Crown has 
transferred the responsibility to engage with communities and iwi to companies and regulators, after 
the inevitably of the activity has already been confirmed. This opens up a floodgate of consultation 
requirements for industry, regulators and iwi. These consultations require resources on all sides, and 
can put strain on the process because of this. 
5. Discussion 
This research has confirmed Gray et al.’s (1991) argument that the channel of accountability can be 
more important than the account itself. Accountability involves both an explaining of conduct with 
a credible story and a calculation and a balance of competing obligations, including moral ones 
(Boland & Schultze, 1996). It is not just about explaining one’s self against a pre-determined set of 
check boxes. Instead, “it involves active enquiry – listening, asking questions, and talking – through 
which the relevance or accuracy of indicators can be understood in context” (O’Neill, 2002, as cited 
in Roberts, 2009, p. 966). This emphasises the importance of the process of providing of an account 
as well as the ability to hold to account (Stewart, 1984). Therefore, accountability for risk in this 
context has three fundamental features. First, to account for risk, is to provide a credible story about 
what is happening now, what could happen next, how one will respond, and why an activity should 
or should not go ahead. Second, to be accountable for risk is to put in place mechanisms for affected 
actors to act upon the account in order to hold the accountor accountable. Finally, these two features 
have to consider the third party to any accountability relationship, the Other. The Other has not 
traditionally been considered within accountability relationships, but also provides the most 
contentious issue in regards to definition.  
5.1 Story-lines 
How society defines accountability is crucially “dependent on the ideologies, motifs and language 
of our times” (Sinclair, 1995, p. 221). In this research, we have seen two relatively powerful story-
lines appealing to fundamental drivers of human behaviour, prosperity and compassion, but with 
completely different outcomes. Both of these story-lines are fighting to appeal to public opinion. 
They are story-lines fighting for the definition of the Other. One is the intragenerational Other, 
                                                            
13 Resource Management Act 1991. 
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creating wealth and prosperity through petroleum exploration now. The other is the 
intergenerational Other, fighting for a stable climate for future generations, species and ecosystems. 
Archel, Husillos and Spence (2011) refer to these as a dominant discourse and a heretic discourse 
and found that for the most part the heretic discourse had been captured through institutionalisation 
by the dominant discourse and that stakeholder consultation processes are problematic for this 
reason. This could explain why some actors in this arena refused to engage in the scant consultation 
processes on offer, and instead protest. But to avoid this capture, an ally story-line is needed that is 
“incapable of assimilation to the logic of economics” (Shearer, 2002, p. 569). Kaitiakitanga has 
been a part of Māori culture since well before the discourse of economics was dominant. Although 
the concept of kaitiakitanga can encompass economic wellbeing, the inescapable connection 
between social, economic and environmental wellbeing through whakapapa14 may be too powerful 
for assimilation. This has the ability to gain traction as a dominant story-line. Andy, a climate 
campaigner suggested that a powerful moment in his involvement in this arena was when Tā15 Mark 
Solomon of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (Kaikōura) stood up at the Takahanga Marae and thanked 
Anadarko for coming to talk with them, but asked them to return so he could show them what 
kaitiakitanga meant. Serena, also from Kaikōura, was asked what she would have shown them. “It 
can often be practical things, but I think I would show them some of the work we’ve been involved 
in and what we’ve achieved.” Serena talked about the difficulty of explaining “the relationship that 
we have to our environment” in words. “Sometimes it’s really hard to just explain a way of life.”  
Serena took the initiative to show other non-Māori Kaikōura residents what kaitiakitanga really 
meant and this has emerged into a powerful collective movement for environmental protection. The 
idea that economic, social, and cultural prosperity in Kaikōura and beyond is fundamentally linked 
to the health of the environment through whakapapa is incredibly appealing. Kaikōura being so 
closely interlinked to the natural environment in which it resides is a useful case study to examine 
how the concept of kaitiakitanga may be moved to the centre of the engagement. This approach to 
kaitiakitanga through education raises interesting ideas for accountability. Namely, how is the 
account or accountability to be performed? It can be written, spoken, shown or, most importantly 
(so it seems), practised. This harks back to the old adage ‘actions speak louder than words.’ 
Accountability through action has recently been explored by Parker (2014), who argues that 
corporate social responsibility can be driven by organisational leaders’ moral responsibility and a 
connection between their personal beliefs and action for a common good. Using historical evidence, 
                                                            
14 Geneaology/ancestry. Whakapapa establishes people as an inseparable part of nature, and says that all things - human 
and environment - are related through ancestry (Rae & Thompson-Fawcett, 2013).   
15 Sir, knight. 
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Parker found that in the cases of Cadbury, Lever, Owen and Salt, social accountability was 
discharged through action consistent with a personal acceptance of responsibility for others.  
5.2 The arena in the risk society 
What we have seen in this arena is very much a “decide, announce and defend” (Kasperson, 2005, 
p.22) strategy of risk communication and accountability on the part of the Government. At the 
moment, New Zealand is still on the ‘stakeholder express’ which includes limited public 
participation, but after predetermined outcomes are decided on (Kasperson, 2005). We can see this 
clearly in responses from participants. Several of them cherished the opportunities to engage either 
through iwi or council, despite not getting the outcome that they wanted. Opening up the process for 
more public participation at the early stages could achieve a more constructive dialogue between 
polarised actors within the arena. A significant part of the outrage in this arena appears to be the 
lack of public participation rather than just the activity itself. Decision-making authorities must 
embrace the “openly uncomfortable and discomfiting” (Byrch, Milne, Morgan & Kearins, 2015, p. 
18) reality of agonistic pluralism, and surrender their attachment to finality (Byrch et al., 2015). 
Kasperson (2005) argues that informing and public participation should occur early, and continue 
throughout the consideration and decision process. Successful risk communications are those where 
the increase in information is tied to an increase in the potential of the public to act upon that 
knowledge. This would be the next step for the Government and industry to take if they are serious 
about public engagement. For many permits and areas it is too late, but these are just exploration 
permits. If at the time of production permits being issued, more public participation was enabled, 
this may be an opportunity for serious dialogue.  
5.3 Responsibility 
According to Sinclair (1995), “the management of one’s own and others’ accountabilities requires 
strategies tied to an understanding of language and ideology, values and ethics, emotion and 
motivation” (p. 221). This argument indicates how actors, sometimes within coalitions, expect and 
discharge accountability for risk around an issue. A general pattern emerged that the greater the risk 
aversion of a participant, the greater the level of accountability they expect from the Government 
and industry. In general, the participants at this end of the spectrum felt a greater responsibility for 
their role in the arena to the Other.  
I was there on behalf of the whales and the dolphins, and the marine ecosystem. My 
responsibility is to protect those things that really matter in life. My responsibility is to protect 
the ocean ecosystems, our future, our grandchildren and everybody’s grandchildren, and 
vulnerable people against big money, big oil, and big industry (Faye). 
24 
 
In general, these participants were taking a long-term view. “For me it’s not about short term jobs, 
it’s about broader issues around sustainability with the economy” (Mary, a city councillor). Rachael 
saw that her “interest as an academic is really to understand that [the risks of an activity] so as to be 
able to develop good policy for our Rūnaka.” Serena believed that her key responsibility was to 
“look after the environment. I think if I can look after the environment then that looks after the 
people within it as well.” The arguments are around the long term prosperity of society, rather than 
just ecology, including economic, social and cultural prosperity. As Beck (1992) argued, through 
their consequences, environmental problems are social problems. They are problems of people, our 
history, our living conditions, our relation to the world and reality, as well as our social, cultural, 
economic and political circumstances. In 1992, Beck wrote that “nature is society and society is 
also ‘nature’” (Beck, 1992, p. 81). This holds even more true today.  
Unlike previous studies or criticisms of accountability, this research has revealed that the idea of 
accountability to the Other, an accountability which considers more than traditional financial 
stewardship, is being expected and discharged in this arena. Conflict arises over whom or what 
exactly the Other is. The Other for some actors is producing wealth within society now, at the 
expense of the ability to produce wealth, equitably, in the future. For different actors, the Other is 
represented by future generations, different species, and the environment itself. The prevailing 
economic discourse does extend the idea of an account for more than just financial resources, but 
only marginally. It is about securing wealth for contemporary society to produce schools, hospitals 
and roads. The alternative discourse about the intergenerational Other broadens the boundaries of 
the societal conception of accountability. These discourses are both flowing through the arena, and 
sometimes colliding. Many actors talk about creating wealth for future generations through the 
economic opportunities of renewable energy, and sometimes actors talk about providing economic 
wealth for future generations by securing Aotearoa New Zealand’s energy future through petroleum 
resources. Either way, actors are trying to appeal to the public with the most credible story. 
Therefore, any engagement needs to be open to ideological poles; accountability should therefore 
aim to take “ideological conflicts seriously” (Brown, 2009, p. 313). 
6. Conclusion 
Using the arena framework as an investigative tool has enabled the engagement among actors 
around the contentious issue of deep sea petroleum exploration to be examined in the context of the 
existing power structures of Aotearoa New Zealand.  In practice we have seen an over-
accountability in terms of provision of accounts by all actors, leading to confusion and distrust and 
an under-accountability in terms of the ability to hold to account with the reduction of opportunities 
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for public participation. This paper has contributed to the stream of social accounting research 
drawing on Renn’s (1992) arena concept by examining actors’ perceptions of accountability for risk. 
During this examination we have discovered that theorising around accountability being about more 
than just the provision of an account is consistent among affected actors. The point of contention is 
about the definition of the Other, the third party to these accountability relationships who affected 
actors claim to represent.  
We have shown that what actors expect from accountability in this arena of deep sea oil exploration 
is in line with what actors see as their personal responsibility. What is expected for accountability in 
this context is not an account of what is going to happen and certainly not what has happened. Nor 
is it simply the right of response to, or the right to act after, an account of action is provided. It is in 
this context an ‘account of responsibilities’ which is rendered (or not) through a process of 
engagement and consultation that meets with approval. To be heard and listened to emerged time 
and again as significant, even if this does not result in a changed outcome: a process that provides 
the right to ‘bear witness’ and ‘have a say’. It is the responsibility of decision-makers to consider 
the Other in decision-making and when considering the Other, to consider the risks, both techno-
scientific, and sociologically derived, in these activities. In this way accountability and the process 
of risk communication are one and the same. According to our findings, accountability can no 
longer be considered providing an account for one’s actions in strict financial or neoclassical terms, 
or even in broader terms of additional and extended social and environmental information. 
Emphasising its process, Shearer (2002) argues that accountability needs to be established as “a 
moral phenomenon that both can and should be subject to ethical reflection” (p. 545, emphasis 
added). This research found that almost every activist raised this idea in some form or another, and 
applied it to their actions and objectives.  
This paper has shown that in the deep sea petroleum exploration arena in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
what actors expect practically from accountability is the ability to ‘have a say’, and have it listened 
to by authorities. This ability to ‘have a say’ did not necessarily have to affect the final outcome, it 
was about actors feeling that they were considered, that they were valued, that they were partners; 
that they were part of the process of accountability. There is significant insight for this conclusion 
within the agonistic democratic accountability literature. A concern is that the emphasis on a fully 
inclusive consensus that works to silence dissent makes it easier for dominant groups to accuse 
other groups of being unreasonable (Brown & Dillard, 2013). This official dialogue has simply not 
been allowed for in the current regulatory framework around deep sea petroleum exploration, and 
has sparked significant resistance. When the industry and public agencies are engaging at a level 
above what is formally required because it is the acceptable social norm, it indicates that the 
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regulatory framework, although brand  new and ‘world-class’, is lagging behind the ‘social norm’. 
This is a significant implication for engagement, because it shows that increasing public 
participation and inclusiveness will be a step forward from the current situation, even if the decision 
outcomes remain unchanged. Being excluded seems to be regarded as a fundamental instance of 
unaccountability. Working to include these voices more cohesively into a decision-making 
framework has the potential to transform antagonistic engagement (Connolly, 2005, as cited in 
Brown & Dillard, 2013).  
The concept of kaitiakitanga also has transformative potential if taken seriously, yet this will be 
difficult. Based on our findings, kaitiakitanga is not something that can easily be spoken of, or 
written about, or even shown or demonstrated. Neither is it an accountability process that is easily 
adopted. Kaitiakitanga appears to be a cultural practice that is lived. Growing use of the term may 
help shift ideas, and growing collaboration between iwi and activist groups as well as iwi and 
industry can help shift the discourse around the importance that kaitiakitanga plays in fostering 
relationships and communication channels between these diverse actors, including non-human 
species. An important step may be through education, at early childhood, primary and tertiary levels. 
This research has uncovered that perceptions and expectations of accountability in the deep sea oil 
exploration arena of Aotearoa New Zealand comes down to process. Although there are reflective 
and moral elements to these perceptions, the experiences and expectations that actors describe 
involve two concrete aspects, the account and the forum to hold to account, with a less concrete 
caveat, an acknowledgement of the Other during this process. This develops an understanding of 
accountability for risk within an arena framework. It has also uncovered the importance of 
recognising and embracing difference in decision-making processes, particularly emphasising the 
importance of acknowledging differences in world-view in an Aotearoa New Zealand context. We 
hope that by embracing this difference and enabling opportunities for participation in decision 
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